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We examine a general equilibrium model with collateral constraints
and increasing returns to scale in production. The utility function
is nonseparable, with no income e⁄ect on the consumer￿ s choice of
leisure. Unlike this model without a collateral constraint, we ￿nd
that indeterminacy of equilibria is possible. Hence, business cycles
can be driven by self-ful￿lling expectations. This is the case for more
realistic parametrizations than in previous, similar models without
these features.
￿Keywords: Business cycles, Credit markets, Collateral Constraint, Sunspots. JEL
Classi￿cation: E321 Introduction
Starting with Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994), a
large literature now exists in which a standard real business cycle model
is modi￿ed to include su¢ ciently high increasing returns to scale, result-
ing in indeterminate equilibria driven by sunspot shocks.1 Jaimovich (2008)
and Meng and Yip (2008) (hereafter MYJ) add non-separable preferences
as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man (1988) (hereafter GHH) to the
one-sector model with increasing returns to scale. With no income e⁄ects on
leisure, they ￿nd that indeterminacy is ruled out, no matter the size of returns
to scale. Here, we overturn MYJ￿ s results by adding a collateral constraint
as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).2 The addition of a collateral constrained
borrowing limit allows for the existence of indeterminacy and hence endoge-
nous, expectations-driven business cycles. In addition, this indeterminacy
results with empirically plausible returns to scale.
In our model, land is the only asset and credit takes on the following
form. Firms must pay for some of their inputs before production takes place,
and so they must borrow within the period. This assumption appears to be
relevant for the workings of typical ￿rms. For example, evidence in Devereux
and Schiantarelli (1989) suggests that ￿rms fund a signi￿cant part of their
current expenses with external funds. In our model, we restrict this funding
to credit from the banking sector. The credit constraint stands in for a lack
of contract enforcement, which limits the amount of credit ￿rms can obtain
with their collateral. If ￿rms fail to repay debt, the creditors will seize the
collateralized land and sell it.
In most previous one-sector models, whether or not indeterminacy results
can be understood as follows. Upon optimistic expectations about the future,
1See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for an excellent survey.
2See also Kocherlakota (2000, 2009).
2agents act upon (subjectively) higher wealth. Hence, labor supply shifts
inwards. In the Benhabib-Farmer-Guo set-up, with increasing returns high
enough to make the reduced form labor demand upward sloping, employment
rises and the expectation is self-ful￿lled. In MYJ￿ s set-up, there is no wealth
e⁄ect on leisure, and so such expectations cannot be self-ful￿lling.
On the contrary, in our model, with a collateral constraint, indeterminacy
can result with downward sloping labor demand and no income e⁄ect. If
people become optimistic about the prospects of the economy, their demand
for assets, in particular, land, rises. As it is in ￿xed supply, the price of
land surges, relaxing the credit constraint. The amount of borrowing goes
up proportionately with the price of the collateralizable land. This starts
a positive feedback: ￿rms are able to expand production as labor demand
shifts out. Real economic activity increases, and the optimistic expectation
is self-ful￿lled.
We examine two versions of the model. In both, indeterminacy is possible.
In the ￿rst, output is produced with labor, land and capital. In addition,
the utilization rate of capital is allowed to vary. As in Wen (1998), including
capital utilization simply serves to lower the threshold level of returns to
scale necessary for indeterminacy, by increasing the elasticity of output with
respect to labor. To further lower this threshold, the second version adds
material inputs into the production function, so that ￿rms produce gross
output. This increases this elasticity even more.
Indeterminacy in the second version of our model is empirically plausible
in two important ways.3 First, the threshold value of returns to scale is within
the range estimated by many authors (for example Harrison, 2003). Second,
this is the case for much lower labor supply elasticities than are typically
assumed in previous work, where an in￿nite labor supply elasticity is often
3Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) obtain indeterminacy in a version of Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). However, they focus on parametrizations with determinacy.
3used (for example Farmer and Guo, 1994 and Wen, 1998). In sum, the lack
of an income e⁄ect, the binding collateral constraint and the inclusion of
materials in the production function, all make sunspot equilibria easier to
obtain.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we outline the
basic model, without material inputs. Section 3 describes the steady state
and calibration. In Section 4, we quantify the regions in which indeterminacy
exists. Section 5 adds material inputs to the model. Section 6 summarizes
and suggests potential applications.
2 The arti￿cial economy
Our economy is based on Kiyotaki and Moore￿ s (1997) model of credit fric-
tions.4 There is no fundamental uncertainty. The economy is populated by
a continuum of (measure one) agents who have identical preferences. Each
agent has access to a production technology. Let ct be consumption and ht

















which corresponds to Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man￿ s (1988) quasi-
convex utility. GHH preferences have the property that the supply of labor
is immune to income e⁄ects. ￿ denotes the discount factor. The disutility of
working is measured by ￿, 1=" corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in labor supply and 1=￿ measures the elasticity of substitution
of consumption. We restrict 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿ > 0, " > 0, and ￿ > 0.
4Some of its simplications follow Kobayashi and Nutahara (2007),
4The period budget constraint is
wtht + yt + qt(at￿1 ￿ at) ￿ wtnt + ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)kt
with income on the left hand side and spending on the right hand side. Here,
wt is the real wage, and kt stands for the stock of capital. We assume that
agents do not work for themselves, and so each hires labor services nt: In
equilibrium, ht = nt: The agents enter the period with land holdings at￿1
while at denotes land holdings during production in period t. Each agent
sells labor, land and capital services, and hires these services in the respective
markets. Land is traded at the beginning of the period at price qt, and is in
￿xed supply, which we normalize to one. Land is of the utmost importance
in our model. It is required to be able to undertake production, which is the
source of its demand.
As in most studies with variable capital utilization, ut, the rate of depre-






t ￿ > 1:










Note that the producers face constant returns to scale at the private level.
Yt stands for aggregate output; and the externality in production is of size
￿. All markets are perfectly competitive.
Each period, the price of land is determined in trade. Next, wages have
to paid. Because the other transactions and production have not yet taken
place, agents are forced to borrow working capital in advance in the form of
(intratemporal) loans from ￿nancial intermediaries. To prevent default, the
availability of credit is restricted by the endogenous borrowing constraint
 qtat ￿ wtnt 0 ￿   ￿ 1:
5As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), this constraint stands in for limited con-
tract enforcement. Borrowers must put up valuable collateral against debt.
The only asset accepted by creditors is land. If borrowers fail to repay their
debt, the creditors will seize the land and sell it. Hence, an agent￿ s loans can-
not exceed the fraction   of the market value of the collateral. Repayment
of the debt is assumed to occur within the current period such that there is
a unit opportunity cost to funds. If   is large, the collateral constraint will
not bind and the model reduces to the standard model. Here, we assume
that this constraint is binding at all times (by choice of parametrization and
its e⁄ect on  ).





























t + qt(at￿1 ￿ at) ￿ wtnt ￿ ct ￿ kt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)kt
i
+￿t [ qtat ￿ wtnt]:




















t = ￿twt (2)
















+ 1 ￿ ￿t+1
￿
￿ ￿t = 0 (5)

















Equations (1) and (2) describe the consumption leisure trade-o⁄. Equation
(3) denotes the demand for labor; this condition is distorted by the borrowing
constraint. In the absence of credit frictions, ￿t = 0, and the standard condi-
tion equating the marginal product and wage results. Equation (4) describes
the intertemporal demand for land. Equation (5) is the usual intertempo-
ral Euler equation and (6) repeats the borrowing constraint. Equation (7)
equates the marginal product and marginal cost of raising the utilization
rate. Equation (8) is the production technology in symmetric equilibrium.
Finally, we have the aggregate resource constraint
yt ￿ ct ￿ kt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)kt = 0 (9)
as well as the equilibrium condition
at = 1: (10)
3 The steady state and calibration
Let us now turn to the unique stationary state of this economy. Since it is not




y , ￿, ￿ and ￿. Once these are set, the steady state can be computed.






+ 1 ￿ ￿
i
= 0
determines ￿. Next (3)














7The intertemporal Euler equation for capital and the collateral constraint
become
￿














These form a system of two equations in two unknowns which can be solved
for
aq
y and  . Lastly,
￿ =
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿
:
We calibrate our economy to averages of the US economy. The fundamental
period is a quarter. In our benchmark calibration, we assume ￿ = 1; ￿ =
1:03￿1=4 and ￿ = 0:02. The capital to GDP ratio is set to 9, which corresponds
to Maddison￿ s (1991) annual value for the US ratio of gross nonresidential
capital stock to GDP. Empirical measures of the intertemporal elasticity of
labor supply, 1=", are largely varied. Kimball and Shapiro (2008) suggest that
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is about one. Gourinchas and Parker
(2002) present estimates that range from 0.7 to 2.2. We set 1=" = 2:2.
Hence, labor supply is signi￿cantly less elastic than is typical of models with
indeterminacy (i.e. in￿nity), and it also less elastic than is normally assumed
in real business cycle models (e.g. King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988, use 4).5
Lastly, we set ￿=￿ = 0:255, to ensure that the credit constraint is binding.
In doing this, we choose the smallest possible value of ￿=￿ given the rest of
our calibration. One way to interpret ￿=￿ is as an endogenous theory of the
labor wedge. We can rewrite our ￿rst order condition for labor, (3), as:
￿
￿ + ￿




5GHH preferences do not nest indivisible preferences, hence " = 0 cannot be interpreted
as Hansen-Rogerson. Jaimovich (2008) states that the Frisch labor supply elasticity is
given by (1 ￿ "h)="h.
8and consider the Chari, et al. (2003) interpretation of the wedge as a tax.
That is, in
(1 ￿ ￿)MPL = w
we have ￿
￿+￿ = 1 ￿ ￿, and hence a wedge of about 20 percent.6















Capital is the only predetermined variable, hence, indeterminacy requires
that at least two eigenvalues of the matrix M are smaller than unity. We
look for indeterminacy in the next Section.
4 Indeterminacy
Our main result is that indeterminacy can in fact result. This stands in sharp
contrast to MYJ, in which indeterminacy is ruled out in the one-sector model
with no income e⁄ect and no collateral constraint.
Result 1: In sharp contrast to MYJ, indeterminate equilibria result in our
model with su¢ ciently high returns-to-scale.
Result 2: In our benchmark calibration, with an elasticity of substitution
of consumption of ￿ = 1 and 1=" = 2:2; indeterminacy arises at returns
to scale of 1.915 and higher.
6The value of   in this calibration is 0.0288. In addition, to make the model and
implied calibrations comparable, we normalize the parameter ￿ so that it approaches zero
(in the benchmark case ￿ = 0:00024). This is motivated by observing that for a positive ￿;
the ￿xed amount of land introduces de facto decreasing returns at the private (and social)
level.
9Clearly, increasing returns of 1.915 are not plausible. Most studies of re-
turns to scale suggest much smaller values. For example, Burnside, Eichen-
baum and Rebelo (1995, Table 2) adjust for utilization, as in the present
model. They report a point estimate of 0.98 with a standard error of 0.34,
which puts 1.915 outside of a reasonable con￿dence interval.
Lowering ￿ and/or "; however, does reduce the threshold of scale economies,
as seen in Figure 1. Here we illustrate the thresholds for indeterminacy for
both ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0:5. Attanasio and Weber (1989), Gruber (2006) and
Mulligan (2002) provide support for the latter value. Still, the model requires
labor supply elasticities well above 10 ( ￿ = 1) or 3 (￿ = 0:5) for plausible
returns to scale. Therefore, we seek to ￿nd more empirically plausible para-
metrizations. Hence, in the next subsection, we examine the requirements
for indeterminacy when we move away from this basic model.
5 Adding material inputs
In this Section, we modify the production function to account for materials
usage. The addition of materials adds another margin along which ￿rms
adjust their production, and increases the elasticity of output with respect
to labor. This is analogous to Wen￿ s (1998) addition of varying capital uti-
lization to the standard model. We denote by mt intermediate goods input.















Furthermore, we assume that the endogenous borrowing constraint becomes
 qtat ￿ wtnt + mt 0 ￿   ￿ 1
which implies that to be able begin production, agents have to obtain working
capital for both the wage bill and materials (see also Kobayashi, Nakajima,









which determines the demand for the intermediate good. We adjust our
benchmark calibration as follows: Jaimovich (2007) suggests a materials share
of gross output of around 50 percent and a labor plus materials share of
around 85 percent. In this vein, we ￿x the share of materials in the model to
be 50 percent of gross output and target the wage share at 35 percent. We
set ￿=￿ = 0:03, to ensure that, given the calibration, the credit constraint
binds. Then, ￿ = 0:515, ￿ = 0:0023, and   = 0:2351.7
Figure 2 plots the indeterminacy regions for the extended model. Result 3
summarizes the results for our benchmark parameterization, and for ￿ = 0:5:
Result 3: In our benchmark calibration of the credit model with material
usage, with ￿ = 1 (￿ = 0:5), indeterminacy arises at returns to scale of
1.205 (1.155) and higher.
In the empirical literature, the estimates of returns to scale most relevant
are that of Harrison (2003, Table 7), who estimates production functions
for gross output, and corrects for utilization. She estimates internal returns
(standard error) to be 0.98 (0.01) and the externality to be 0.165 (0.035).
Returns to scale of 1.205 are well within two standard deviations of Harrison￿ s
(2003) estimate. In addition, recall that we have " = 1=2:2, while in all
existing work that we know of, in￿nitely elastic labor supply is used to achieve
indeterminacy with plausible returns to scale.
7In 2000, Total Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks were 3.488 billion of current US
dollars (source: Federal Reserve￿ s FRED). The sum of aggregate market vales of residential
land, values of homes and replacement cost of residential structures amounted to 27.500
billion (source Lincoln Institute of Land Policy). Hence, our value of   does not seem
unreasonable. In addition, alowing it to increase leads to implausible values of other
parameters in our model.
11In￿nitely elastic labor supplies are hard to defend from a microeconomet-
ric perspective (see for example Gourinchas and Parker, 2002; however Roger-
son and Wallenius (2009) discuss reasons why microeconomic and macroeco-
nomic estimates of labor-supply elasticities can di⁄er). Moreover, Lubik
(2007) estimates a sunspot model (a version of Wen, 1998) using US data.
His estimates do suggest degrees of return to scale used in the theoretical
literature; but these are too small for sunspot equilibria to arise, given his
estimated labor supply elasticity: he ￿nds that labor supply slopes up. That
is, he rejects the indivisible labor argument of a completely elastic supply
schedule in Benhabib-Farmer-Guo-Wen frameworks. In the present model,
indeterminacy can arise with downward sloping labor demand and realistic
labor supply elasticities.
For more perspective on this, and for a better comparison with Wen
(1998) and Benhabib and Farmer (1996), Figure 3 looks also at very high
labor supply elasticities in the present model, from 10 to 1000. For ￿ = 1
(0:5), with " = 1=100, minimum returns to scale are 1.072 (1.028), and when
" = 1=1000; they are 1.069 (1.025). These values are quite close to constant
returns. Comparing our results with very high labor supply elasticity to pre-
vious work, our model obtains indeterminacy at considerably lower returns
to scale. Wen (1998) for example needs returns to scale of about 1.11 to
obtain indeterminacy.
5.1 Intuition
Overall, our results demonstrate that indeterminacy appears at reasonable
levels of both returns to scale and labor supply elasticities. But what drives
our results? In particular, how can indeterminacy occur here when it is ruled
out in Jaimovich? In the Benhabib-Farmer-Wen models, sunspots work as
follows. Upon optimistic expectations about the future, agents act upon (sub-
jectively) higher wealth. Hence, labor supply shifts inwards. With increasing
12returns high enough to make the reduced form labor demand upward slop-
ing, employment rises and the expansionary sunspot cycle starts. In MYJ￿ s
set-up, there is no income e⁄ect on leisure, and so such expectations cannot
be self-ful￿lling.
However, in our model, with a collateral constraint, income e⁄ects are not
necessary for indeterminacy to arise. Indeterminacy arises as a consequence
of a relaxed credit constraint induced by optimistic expectations that drive
up land prices. In particular, if people become optimistic about the prospects
of the economy ￿for whatever extrinsic reason ￿their demand for assets, in
particular, land, rises. As it is in ￿xed supply, the price of land rises, relaxing
the credit constraint. Firms are able to expand production as distortions
shrink: even though technology is una⁄ected, the downward-sloping labor
demand shifts out. Real economic activity increases, and the optimistic
expectation is self-ful￿lled.
The behavior of aggregate variables under indeterminacy can be seen in
Figure 4, which plots the impulse responses of the benchmark model with
material usage to a one time pessimistic shock to expectations. Increasing
returns are set at 1.22, which is just above the minimum requirement for
indeterminacy. GDP, hours, consumption and the price of land all fall on
impact (i.e. are procyclical) and all variables are very persistent. The drop in
consumption is smaller than output￿ s, re￿ ecting a lower relative volatility of
consumption, consistent with the data.8 Hours also fall, and their deviation
from steady state appears to be more persistent than the other variables.
The sunspot shock a⁄ects the ￿nancing possibilities of ￿rms, and therefore
their ability to hire new labor. Since the borrowing limit depends on asset
values, the sharp fall in land prices reduces available credit.
It should be noted that inclusion of a income e⁄ect will actually counter
this mechanism. That is, a leftward shift of labor supply would diminish
8Investment is more volatile than output.
13the expansionary nature of the sunspot shock. It may, in fact, prevent the
expectation from being realized. For example, consider a special case of King,
Plosser and Rebelo (1988) preferences that is often used in previous work:
u(ct;ht) = lnct ￿ ￿ht:
This corresponds to Hansen￿ s (1985) real business cycle model. In this case,
with in￿nitely elastic labor supply, the minimum increasing returns required
for indeterminacy in the benchmark parametrization with materials would
rise to 1.567. Here, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure is not independent of consumption and thus income e⁄ects are
present in the labor supply decision. Hence, an optimistic sunspot, which
can be interpreted as a positive wealth shock, causes a rise in leisure and
a decline in labor. Under constant or low increasing returns, this leads to
a decrease in output, thus generating a recession. Put another way, this
version of the model requires much larger externalities to overturn the
shift of labor supply.
6 Conclusion and future work
We have examined a general equilibrium model with collateral constraints
and increasing returns to scale in production. With nonseparable utility, no
income e⁄ect on the consumer￿ s choice of leisure, and materials in the pro-
duction function, indeterminacy of equilibria arises for more realistic para-
metrization than in previous, similar models without these features.
In terms of applications, we have in mind an explanation of the recent
￿nancial crisis, as well as other episodes in the economic history of the US. In
particular, the current crisis has renewed interest among macroeconomists in
models with credit frictions. In particular, we are interested in the role that
14speculative asset market bubbles play in this context.9 Of course, the idea
that economies are inherently subject to bouts of speculation that lead to
alternating booms and crises is not new,10 but the application of a model with
indeterminacy of equilbria to such an episode will add to our understanding
of them.
The model certainly has applications to historical episodes as well. Har-
rison and Weder (2006) apply a model with indeterminacy, but without a
collateral constraint, to the 1930s, ￿nding evidence that sustained pessimism
turned what might have been a recession into the Great Depression. The
introduction of a collateral constraint into this framework is likely to prove
productive. In addition, Harrison and Weder (2009) examine the Roaring
Twenties as a time of technological progress. Evidence of optimism during
that decade bodes well for our model. While the Great Depression can be
viewed as a time of pessimism in which collateral constraints were binding,
their relaxation during the 1920s may provide a sound explanation for the
roaring nature of that decade. In addition, it may also be more realistic to
allow for intertemporal borrowing.11 We plan to pursue these ideas in future
work.
9See, for example, Kocherlakota (2000, 2009).
10See for example, Minsky (1985) and Kindleberger (2000). See also Akerlof and Shiller
(2009), along with Farmer￿ s (2009) critical review.
11Thanks to Keiichiro Kobayashi for suggesting this to us.
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